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This is an extraordinary book in honour of an extraordinary academic. The former is spoken 
to by the range of chapters contributed by individuals from various walks of legal life and 
corners of the globe. The latter is also demonstrated by the spread of contributors, and is 
evidenced by the lengthy bibliography of work towards the end of the book. The affection and 
esteem held for Professor George Lidderdale Gretton was further corroborated by a well-
attended conference (at which the book was launched). I was lucky enough to attend that 
conference and my attendance gives a certain insight into some of the papers which were 
spoken to on the day. However, the book stands alone for readers who were unable to be 
there. 
As might be expected in a book with so many contributors, the chapters display 
differences in style and subject. Fortunately, and most importantly, none fall short in terms of 
substance. All make welcome contributions to the topics discussed. Some authors are a bit 
less Gretton-centric than others: for example, David Johnston and Lars van Vliet simply offer 
insightful essays on their respective subjects, namely the auctor in rem suam principle and the 
treatment of double sales in French law. Others use George’s work as a springboard for 
further analysis. Some offer personal anecdotes: I enjoyed Jan Peter Schmidt’s recollection of 
a game of chess he played against George. The text conveys a sense that many contributors 
enjoyed themselves: witness Laura Macgregor’s adaptation of a Star Trek misquote when she 
describes how agency sits with Scottish partnerships: “It’s agency, Jim, but not as we know 
it” (94). And there are tangents in the book that are a joy: Hector MacQueen brings the tale of 
an undelivered deed to life in a glorious historical footnote detailing that a failure to deliver 
was actually the result of patricide (103-104). Tempting as it is to recount more content in this 
review, it would be a disservice to paraphrase all that caught my eye. I will simply applaud 
the writers for their efforts and the editors for allowing the freedom for such flourishes. 
 
As to the substantive content, part one is on “case law”. Other than George’s own 
reflections towards the end of the book, this is the sole part that is not based on a traditional 
doctrinal category. Its sui generis chapter is an exhortation by John Blackie for Scots lawyers 
to read sixteenth and seventeenth century case law. That seems like an ambitious quest, but he 
makes a convincing case. His study around the remedy of division and sale in situations 
where a co-owner seeks to exit the ownership arrangement, and whether a co-owner can buy 
out the other co-owner(s), is one example of his ammunition. His observations on one of 
George’s favourite words – “patrimony” – are enlightening. 
 
Part two is on the law of evidence. This topic’s inclusion in the book might be 
surprising to some, given the specialisms George went on to develop, but Gerry Maher 
expertly riffs off an old article by a young Gretton on burdens of proof and special defences.  
I found myself drawn into his fascinating chapter. I suspect the main danger Maher’s essay 
faces is not being noticed by those who could be thought of as his target audience, namely 
specialists in criminal law and evidence, who may not expect to find such an essay in a 
collection celebrating a private lawyer. If this review plays a part in staving off that risk, it 
will have served a valuable function. 
 
Part three begins with a chapter by Ross Anderson, which he describes as a 
“superficial dusting-down of a forgotten doctrine”. He is too modest. Anderson’s 
contribution, entitled “A Whimsical Subject: Confusio”, is Grettonian. (That neologism is 
MacQueen’s, not mine.) In an essay that uses copious authority from a variety of legal 
systems, Anderson explains why his subject matter is indeed whimsical, before setting out 
two distinct principles threading through the doctrine which comes into play where a debtor 
in an obligation also becomes the corresponding creditor, or where the holder of a subordinate 
real right in a thing also becomes its owner, in terms of “validity” (of a legal act) and 
“consequences” (how that act affects other matters). To my mind, this chapter and his co-
editorship discharge rather than suspend the “many and deep” debts Anderson declares he 
owes George. 
 
Eric Clive’s essay looks at the notion of a “requirement”, using the Unidroit 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts and its commentary as his foil. Clive 
acknowledges the relevant text he critiques is “excellent and full of insight”, but highlights 
particular passages where it mischaracterises a requirement (i.e. a need to do something 
before a legal position changes) as an obligation (i.e. something a person must do, or face 
legal consequences). The one unfair criticism of this essay I might offer is its relative lack of 
discussion about language (and other languages) as compared to what accompanied Clive’s 
presentation at the aforementioned conference: the essay only makes brief reference to the 
German idea of Obligonheit (incumbency). I acknowledge this is the most quibbly of 
quibbles, and the essay should still stand alone for anyone who was not at the conference.  
 
Patrick Hodge offers the first of the book’s contributions by a judge, on the 
development of the law of contract. He swings the lovely image of a pendulum into his 
chapter, explaining how courts have policed wayward swings of this pendulum in matters of 
ascertainment of contractual terms (through interpretation, implication of terms, and 
rectification) and regulation of the contract at common law (through penalty clauses and 
legality).  
 
Niall Whitty’s chapter on mandates to pay is characteristic of the book, providing 
further thorough analysis of its subject matter and making use of Gretton’s scholarship in the 
process. He works through older and comparative sources before considering contemporary 
issues of electronic funds transfers. In terms of future work in this area, Whitty’s essay set me 
thinking about cryptocurrency: what would the implications of a misplaced Bitcoin payment 
be? The comprehensive contributions of Macgregor and MacQueen have been alluded to 
above. Both offer observations about future reform. Macgregor argues Scottish partnership 
law should be near the top of the issues for the Scottish Law Commission to consider, 
although it can be noted that it does not feature in the recently announced Tenth Programme 
of Law Reform. Meanwhile, and notwithstanding recent statutory reforms, MacQueen 
ponders whether there might be wider recognition of party autonomy when it comes to 
delivery. 
 
This part also contains Peter Webster’s consideration of the continued existence of 
the contract of lease. This partially continues a scholarly dialogue between Douglas Bain and 
Catherine Bury (“A, B and C to A, Revisited” 2013 Jur. Rev. 77) and Lord Gill’s analysis in 
another festschrift (Frankie McCarthy, James Chalmers and Stephen Bogle (eds), Essays in 
Conveyancing and Property Law in Honour of Professor Robert Rennie (2015)). In contrast 
to Lord Gill, Webster argues that a (personal) lease can still exist between a landlord and 
tenant even where the arrangement falls short of the requirements of the Leases Act 1449 or 
the Registration of Leases Act 1857. The location of this chapter is also worthy of comment: 
Webster’s case evidently convinced the editors to file it under “obligations”, a positioning 
land lawyers reading this book will need to stay wise to. Land lawyers should also be careful 
not to miss Cusine’s exposition of the doctrine of coming to the nuisance, which is also 
(properly) in the part on obligations. Finally, the positioning of Johnston’s chapter on auctor 
in rem suam might surprise some, who may associate the doctrine with the rules applicable to 
trustees. Johnston’s study maps the Roman sources (and the rules relating to tutor and pupil, 
to prevent a tutor acting where he was personally interested) then explains how Scots law 
came to diverge from it, including in circumstances beyond a trust. 
 
Part four is on the law of property. I draw particular attention to the contribution of 
Kenneth Reid as I fear his contribution might not reach all interested readers. This is not 
because lawyers of the relevant specialism are unlikely to find it; rather, my concern is those 
involved in wider questions of land reform, land policy and transparency of ownership other 
than lawyers might not. Questions of transparency and follow-on questions of accountability 
influenced the passage of Part 3 of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016. This provides a 
framework for a register of controlling interests in land. Reid’s essay shows that Scotland was 
surprisingly close to introducing a system for disclosing the beneficial ownership of any 
landowning entity as part of the Land Registration (Scotland) Act 1979, but that proposal was 
dropped from the relevant bill and forgotten. Some forty years later, issues of transparency 
remain. Without meaning to criticise, I only wish this essay had been published sooner, 
although now Reid has brought the matter to light this might influence future development.  
 
Three chapters consider “rights” of security. Those inverted commas are prompted by 
the work of Lionel Smith, who suggests that the core of proper security is not a right at all, 
but rather a set of Hohfeldian powers and privileges. This curiously named chapter – 
“Powership and its objects” – is yet another offering of deep thinking which builds on 
George’s work. In a way, it sits alongside Clive’s study of requirements, owing to its detailed 
consideration of what words and concepts mean, albeit Smith’s focus is very much on (real) 
security interests. Unperturbed by Smith’s analysis of powers and privileges in security, 
Andrew Steven offers a chapter entitled “George Gretton and the Scots Law of Rights in 
Security”. Funnily enough, this builds on George’s immense contribution in this area, which 
has culminated in the recent Scottish Law Commission Report on Moveable Transactions. 
Steven’s chapter serves as useful background to that report; a report which he and George can 
be proud of. The third submission on security comes from John MacLeod, who revisits 
another Gretton greatest hit on the concept of security with aplomb. This is another essay that 
is – dare I say it – Grettonian. I particularly appreciated MacLeod’s comparison of 1987 
Gretton and 2017 Gretton. The sole meaningful observation this reviewer might offer to this 
comprehensive coverage is a slight regret that these chapters did not cross-refer to each other 
more; but again, that is to quibble. 
 
The remaining property chapters are on standalone topics. John Lovett considers 
“tacking”, which is the Louisianan term for joining periods of possession by different 
individuals together for the purposes of acquisitive prescription.  Lovett’s engaging chapter 
concludes by noting how Scots law could have avoided the litigious saga that forms his 
backdrop, in this scenario because the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 would 
have forced early consideration of the authenticity of a disputed deed. Intriguingly, Gretton 
has recently offered a counterpoint to this in a different edited collection, where he argues the 
Scots law requirement of a “colour of title” could be sensibly abolished or restricted 
(“Reforming the law of prescriptive title to land” in Douglas Bain, Roderick R M Paisley, 
Andrew R C Simpson and Nikola Tait, Northern Lights: Essays in Private Law in Memory of 
Professor David Carey Miller (2018)). Lars van Vliet offers a Dutchman’s perspective on 
French law in English. His study relates to what Scots property lawyers call the “offside 
goals” rule. His mapping of the fluctuations of Roman law, the writing of Baldus, then 
subsequent French approaches is quietly efficient, especially in its analysis of the most recent 
French reform that was implemented in 2016. Elizabeth Cooke then provides perspective on 
English land law and specifically land registration litigation. Her view on the English tribunal 
system is timely, especially as Scotland has recently moved much of its decision making to 
the tribunal system. I confess I found it hard to visualise the tribunal system Cooke was 
describing at times, although this is more to do with the structure itself than her description of 
it. Her perspectives as the Principal Judge of the Land Registration Division of the First-Tier 
Tribunal on dispute resolution are particularly welcome. To those observations, the thoughts 
of Robert Rennie as occasional expert determiner in boundary disputes can be added. His 
robust analysis of such disputes, with his comparison between Sasine and Land Registered 
titles and attempts to tease out principles for disputes involving the latter, will be of use to 
Scots practitioners. The last essay in this part comes from Sarah Wolffe (the book’s second 
judicial contributor) and James Wolffe (the current Lord Advocate). They supply an essay on 
a topic that might seem obscure, namely property problems in building contracts.  This is 
another study that will prove helpful to those in practice when faced with difficult questions 
around ownership of building materials, which could feasibly be of commercial rather than 
purely academic concern. 
 
The chapters on succession begin with Alan Barr’s offering on the mental capacity 
needed to write a valid testament: the will to make a will, if you will. In another essay of both 
practical and theoretical significance, Barr persuasively argues on numerous fronts that there 
should be no power for an authorised individual to write a will for an adult with incapacity. 
Jan Peter Schmidt’s paper looks at universal succession, explaining what that is generally 
thought to mean and how creditors are catered for where such a complete transfer takes place. 
Alexandra Braun probes at the penumbra of succession law, looking at devices straddling the 
boundaries between succession law and other doctrinal areas like property, contract, trusts 
and indeed company law. Reinhard Zimmermann and Jakob Gleim offer another comparative 
masterpiece on “common calamities”; that is to say, a situation where two people die together 
but with no indication of the order of death. They set out why it is most appropriate for a legal 
system not to presume any order of death in such circumstances. Again, I am restricted to one 
minor observation: would it not have been possible to make more reference to the Succession 
(Scotland) Act 2016, which now reflects their preferred position? The final chapter in the 
succession part is from Roddy Paisley, which is surely the most comprehensive essay on the 
meaning of the word “ademption” written in the English language.  
 
Marius de Waal begins the part on trusts, with a targeted and effective comparison of 
specific aspects of trust governance in Scotland and South Africa. Scots readers will be 
interested in his proposals for reform in relation to: the permissibility of a trustee’s 
resignation in the face of a prohibition in the trust deed; the formalities of a resignation; and 
in relation to judicial removal of trustees. The other chapter in this part is provided by James 
Drummond Young, offering a vital perspective on the use of trusts in modern commercial 
practice. In the process, he makes the case that an express trust is much preferred to an 
implied trust, and gives a valuable perspective on the views expressed by Lord Hope in 
Lehman Brothers International (Europe) v CRC Credit Fund Ltd [2012] UKSC 6. Granted, 
this is Lord Drummond Young writing extra-judicially, but his remarks here will be 
impossible to ignore in any similar future disputes.  Whilst Lord Drummond Young’s essay is 
saved until the end, he also appears earlier in the book. MacLeod refers to his judicial output, 
scrutinising his treatment of diligence in McMillan v T Leith Developments Limited [2017] 
CSIH 23. More intriguingly, his pre-bench career is referred to by Steven, when readers 
discover that Mr Drummond Young acted as advocate at various stages of the “all sums” 
retention of title clause saga. The book has several delightful revelations such as this. 
 
The final substantive words in the book fall to the honoree. Again, it would be both 
wrong and unwise to seek to paraphrase them in this short review, but his championing of 
comparative law, which this collection undoubtedly adds to, and his (philosophical) 
observations on legal scholarship are noteworthy. Also of interest are George’s observations 
on academic life and his attempt to explain the changes that have transpired since he started at 
the University of Edinburgh in 1981. Readers are told the story is one of “evolution, not 
revolution” (395).  This put me in mind of an article in the Journal of the Law Society of 
Scotland (“The Shape of Things to Come” (2010) 55(3) JLSS 22), where George used that 
very phrase twice as he sought to reassure the Scottish legal profession that they had nothing 
to fear from reforms to land registration law. It is almost as if George was trying to underplay 
the law reform exercise to which he contributed so much. Readers of this book will be left in 
absolutely no doubt as to the impact George has had. 
 
Alas, the book is not error free. The occasional rogue punctuation mark, formatting 
error or typo distracts the reader. None of the mistakes I spotted have a material impact. That 
said, I will highlight two unfortunate errors: the incorrect use of “dispones” rather than 
“disponee” in one essay briefly confounded me, and for some reason the contents page 
suggests Blackie’s study is of seventeenth and eighteenth, rather than sixteenth and 
seventeenth, century case law. 
 
The final words in this review are given over to another factor which makes this book so 
attractive, namely the picture worth a thousand words that adorns the book’s cover, of the Old 
College Quad (by Paul Dodds, reproduced with the permission of the University of 
Edinburgh). That the Quad is resplendent with a lawn rather than a car park is yet another 
thing that was influenced by George, who made a nuisance of himself to champion this 
change of use. (Did George come to the nuisance? Perhaps Cusine’s chapter can offer some 
guidance, if so.) This landscape itself now offers tribute to a man who did so much for 
Scottish land law. He can be proud of that. In turn, the editors and contributors to his 
festschrift can be proud of the tribute they have offered to him. 
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